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Abstract 
It is yet to be understood as to what is the right thing to do to control a global menace, which systematically uses 
violence to create a general climate of fear in a population with the hope of achieving some particular political 
objective. This global phenomenon, known today as terrorism, has been practiced by political organizations of 
diverse orientations and objectives, by nationalistic and religious groups, by revolutionaries, and even by state 
institutions such as armies, intelligence services, and police. In effect, terrorism appears to be an enduring 
feature of political life. The search for solution has given sleepless nights to both scholars, state functionaries, 
and even many victims of the attack. Many experts nonetheless, question the credibility of defeating the 
terrorists by attacking them. Their fear is based on the high costs involved in countering terrorism. Certainly, 
proposals for an effective and just response to this global problem differ as do the recommendations about how 
to get the world safer for human habitation. It is in response to this global search for solution to a problem that 
has plagued West Africa that this study undertakes to examine how the United Nations Arms Trade Treaty can 
help the New ECOWAS Counter Terrorism Strategy to achieve its goals. 
 
Introduction 
Terrorism is a value laden word that defies precise definition. It is a concept that is charged with political 
motives. The definitional problem is compounded when researchers try to balance the need to identify 
commonalities against the need to recognize unique features of individual cases. Should Al Qaeda and 
Palestinian sky-jackers, Basque separatists and Niger Delta militants, Boko Haram and South American 
kidnappers be seen as similar? Should Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) be placed in the same category 
with the insurgents that produced the American, French and Russian revolutions? Do their actions resemble the 
tactics of Ku Klux Klan or the big barons trafficking drugs across the globe? Was the “state terrorism” of Adolf 
Hitler and that of Mao Tse Tung part of the global terrorist movement?   Is an attack on a human rights principle 
different from the terrorist attack on human life? How should the US and the Soviet balance of terror during the 
Cold War be classified in today’s terrorist ethos? Nations must agree on what terrorism is not. It is not easy to 
prevent nations from arming terrorists if these nations do not first agree on who the terrorists are, or on what 
constitutes terrorism. 
Nonetheless, the word -terror- was first coined in the 1790s during the French Revolution by the 
revolutionaries against their opponents. The Jacobin party of Maximilien Robespierre carried out a reign of 
terror involving mass executions by the guillotine. Although terrorism at that usage implies an act of violence by 
a state against its domestic enemies, since the 20th century the term has been applied most frequently to violence 
aimed, either directly or indirectly, at governments in an effort to influence policy or topple an existing regime.1  
Terrorism in West Africa has its historical roots. The West African political history reveals that its leaders and 
their supporters deployed various tactics including sponsored mutinies to win independence; the efforts were to 
counter the institutionalized violence perpetrated by the colonial authorities. In Nigeria, the Aba Women’s riot 
and the 1921 Oke-Ogun Uprising were quelled by Imperial Britain through commando-like guerrilla tactics and 
bush-action.2 Even after gaining political independence there were various state-sponsored militants usually 
equipped by the state with the aim of keeping particular regimes in power. The 28 November 2010, disputed 
presidential election of Ivory Coast is an example of a state-sponsored terrorism which resulted in the paralysis 
of the country by a political tug of war between President Laurent Gbagbo and Alassane Ouattara. The election 
dispute took a terrifying pattern of violence where state-sponsored militants loyal to Gbagbo known as The 
Young Patriots were involved in nationalistic and xenophobic violence using terrorism tactics to kill and harass 
northerners and Ivoirians of alleged ‘foreign descent’. “Gbagbo regularly made use of a dangerously 
unpredictable youth militia to take to the streets, rioting, burning and killing in support of his regime. He never 
overtly incited them, but proxies did so. He didn’t use hate speech to stir up xenophobic sentiment; his 
supporters did it for him.”3 Though this paper focuses on non-state terrorism, yet this type of state-sponsored 
terrorism is not uncommon in the political landscape of many West African states.  
Non-state terrorism refers to those acts of terrorism that are carried out by persons or local groups 
within the state that are meant to redress domestic grievances.4 Domestic terrorism has a long history in West 
Africa. Revolutionary and secessionist groups, marginalized communities struggling for resource control and 
religious fundamentalists find themselves in this category. Foday Sankoh’s Revolutionary United Front (RUF) of 
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Sierra Leone, the Movement of Democratic Forces in the Casamance in Southern Senegal, the Movement for the 
Emancipation of the Niger Delta (MEND) and a religious fundamentalist - Jama'atu Ahlis Sunna Lidda'awati 
Wal-Jihad - (‘People Committed to the Propagation of the Prophet's Teachings and Jihad’) identified as Boko 
Haram are known examples. The political violence carried out by Boko Haram has today claimed thousands of 
lives in Nigeria and the situation continue to further deteriorate5as the group questions the corporate existence of 
Nigeria. Boko Haram close link with Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) has today complicated the 
political terrain of domestic terrorism, which gives rise to transnational terrorism. International or transnational 
terrorism refers to terrorist acts by persons or groups that are external to the affected state and whose objective is 
to advance an extraterritorial cause.6 In West Africa, this brand of terrorism is fast becoming a major threat to 
political and human security. The origin of AQIM can be traced to an Algerian terrorist group called Armed 
Islamic Group (AIG); a dissident branch later sprang up from AIG called Salafist Group for Preaching and 
Combat (GSPC) and having made little progress, GSPC announced its allegiance to Al-Qaeda operating under a 
new name AQIM.7  
AQIM is indeed present and active in the Western Sahel; a largely desert and sparsely populated region 
spanning from the borders of Algeria, Mauritania, Niger and parts of Mali.8 The intensification of the activities 
of AQIM in West Africa more especially in Mauritania, Mali and Niger and now Nigeria is worrisome. As the 
region is increasingly becoming a hub of terrorism and a fertile ground for breeding terrorist networks, there is a 
more increasing need to understand the link between terrorism in West Africa and arms trade. To this end, this 
study will be guided by these questions: Why is terrorism a thriving business today in West Africa? What 
structural state weaknesses exist in the region that has given rise to terrorism? Do porous borders, corruption and 
bad governance provide an added impetus for the creation of sanctuaries as well as radicalization and 
recruitment of new terrorist members? Is poverty related to terrorism? How does the new ECOWAS strategy 
address the challenges posed by terror in the region? Can the control of arms trade facilitate human and political 
security in the region? In the light of recent events in West Africa with some scholars attesting to the geographic 
nature of terrorism, this study gives a political survey of the sub-region. 
 
Political Survey of West Africa 
For about five decades, from 1960 to 2013 precisely, West Africa has been known as the most politically 
unstable region of Africa since it hosted 70% of the coup d’état and military interventions with the most affected 
countries being Burkina Faso (1980, 1982, 1983, 1987), Mauritania (1980, 1984), Liberia (1980, 1989), Nigeria 
(1966, 1983, 1985), Guinea Bissau and Mali. In 1985 alone, 11 of the 16 countries of West Africa had military 
regimes.9 The intrusion of the military into politics triggered many problems. At the national levels, military 
regimes often failed to respect their commitment to return power to civilians thus remaining as dictators. Nigeria 
stands as the best example with the military holding on to power for about 27 years (from 1960 to 1997); 
democratic institutions and values were ruined. As the military encroached into politics in Nigeria, the same 
applies to Togo, Mali, Benin, Ghana, Gambia, Sierra Leone, Burkina Faso, Liberia, Mauritania, Niger, and 
Guinea. In many instances, journalists were incarcerated. In 1980 Sergeant Samuel Doe eliminated President 
Tubman of Liberia to gain and  hold on to power; in 1987, in Burkina Faso, Captain Blaise Compaoré toppled 
his colleague Thomas Sankara to replace him as the head of the state; some pro-Sankara senior officers were 
executed in the process after accusing them of a phantom coup. In 1981, flight lieutenant Jerry Rawlings 
executed numerous statesmen in Ghana accusing them of corruption and mismanagement of national wealth. 
Besides the military intervention into politics, the region has experienced lots of wars. In West Africa, civil wars 
had been fought in Cote d'Ivoire, Guinea, Liberia, Nigeria, Sierra Leone, Togo and Mali. Military intervention, 
wars and now terrorist acts attest to the region’s instability. Interestingly very few or rather none of the wars 
have been between the various countries that makes up the region. Rather in almost all cases they have been civil 
wars. Unfortunately these internecine wars have been some of the most brutal on the planet as the various 
factions seek to completely wipe each other out.10 Civil wars and terrorism have left millions dead in West 
Africa.  
Many questions had been raised for the recurring conflicts and wars that had afflicted the sub-region. 
There is an understanding that most of these communal entities were not really nation-states before the 
Europeans arrived. Rather they were ethnic nationalities that each had its own traditional area where it lived. The 
Europeans however drew lines on a map in order to fit their own needs. The result was that as colonialism ended, 
new countries were formed that included people of diverse ethnic groupings. The outcome was that each of the 
tribes sought to politically control the new country; this resulted to civil wars. Wars are not eternal. As these 
destructive wars came to an end, many West African countries went back to electoral politics. Democratic 
experiments have not yielded the desired dividends in the region as poverty is still quite pronounced; indeed, the 
region is one of the poorest in the world where the majority live on less than one US Dollar a day.  In West 
Africa, infant mortality rates are among the highest in the world; less than half of the adult population is literate; 
agriculture remains the dominant of productive activity; and four out of every five people live in rural areas even 
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as the world is undergoing rapid urbanization.11  
West Africa is indeed descriptive of a region where serious deprivations in many aspects of life face so 
many people. Economically, West Africa plays the same world-wide economic role that it has for the previous 
five centuries - providing natural resources from its plentiful supplies, and markets for manufactured goods. The 
region is known for its chronic unemployment. Failure in democracy increases the spate of terrorism in the 
region. Today, the region is increasingly becoming a hub of terrorism and a fertile ground for breeding terrorist 
networks. Organized crime syndicates, illegal natural resource exploitation and transfer, human and drug 
trafficking and money laundering among other transnational criminal activities have preposterously begun to 
flourish in the region and in concert they continue to play cardinal roles in the financing of terrorism and the 
potential exportation of terrorism to other parts of the globe. From all indications, terrorism poses an alarming 
kind of contemporary violence. It has emerged in recent years as a major threat to global peace and security. 
Though it has a universal manifestation as already shown, West Africa is one of the hardest hit regions. 
Terrorism is a tactic of the weak against the powerful. Thus, it is not surprising that in West Africa, political or 
social minorities, religious fundamentalists and ethnic movements sometimes turn to acts of terrorism on behalf 
of their political causes.12 In West Africa, kidnapping, hijacking, hostage-taking, bombing, suicide attacks, and 
murder characterize this reprehensible activity. 
The threat of terrorism in West Africa is enormous and poses daunting challenges to not only security 
management in the region but also political stability and economic development. Thus, whether as a result of 
civil wars or terrorist activities the abundant supply of small arms, ammunition, light weapons and explosives 
has played a crucial role.  Circulation of small arms and light weapons within the region since the end of the cold 
war has made easy the escalation of tensions between groups in disagreement. Bloody massacres and massive 
human displacement become quick problem solutions when black market gun running is rampant. Moreover, 
since most countries in the region do not manufacture weapons, therefore most of the arms possessed by the 
armed gang have been imported. To curb the suffering caused by the unregulated availability of these small arms 
and light weapons, the West African region needs to address the supply side of arms and the manner in which 
they come into the region. With the strong linkage between the supply of small arms and light weapons and 
terrorist activities, the need for negotiating a comprehensive and global Arms Trade Treaty is very essential; 
there is the critical need for West Africa to be supportive of whatever endeavors made by the United Nations in 
reaching agreement with governments worldwide on the principles, content and scope of a legally binding 
instrument to curb the problems associated with arms proliferation. 
 
Arms proliferation in West Africa 
Small arms and light weapons (SALW) till date remain the primary weapons of armed insurrections, armed 
terrorist activities, intra-and inter-communal feuds, civil wars and other religious-sectarian violence throughout 
the sub-region. Every West African country has experienced widespread violence in which these weapons of 
destruction featured. SALW have particularly fuelled overlapping and rebellious conflicts presently in Mali. In 
previous years, small and light weapons featured prominently in conflicts in Côte d’Ivoire, Guinea-Bissau, 
Liberia, Mali, Niger, Nigeria, Senegal, Sierra Leone and Togo. SALW have been used to subvert constitutions, 
to carry out coups d’état and to create and maintain a general state of fear, insecurity and instability most 
especially by military dictators in Nigeria and other West African countries. In these countries, human rights 
have been violated as a cover-up for bad governance. In other occasions SALW are employed for non-political 
and non-conflict-related crime and violence, such as armed robbery and kidnapping. In conflict situations, some 
states in West Africa have liberalized gun possession laws in order to stimulate civilian arming. Arms were 
directly distributed to paramilitary groups by governments in order to fight rebel forces during the civil wars in 
Côte d’Ivoire, Liberia and Sierra Leone, but legislation was also liberalized, and proved a major driver of small 
arms diffusion. There are instances when many of these weapons come from war-torn countries in and outside 
Africa. It is against this backdrop that President Jonathan rationalized that his imposition of a state of emergency 
in Borno, Adamawa and Yobe states was to mop up arms that came into Nigeria from the Libyan uprising:  
              We must comb the whole place to seize all these weapons and so on. A lot of free weapons 
come in because of the Libya crisis. We must seize them. They are illegal weapons and must 
be seized and you cannot do that without declaring a state of emergency to enable the military 
enter any house, whether it is a residential building, it is a church, a mosque, a shrine, 
anywhere, hotel, anything that we suspect. We will be able to enter and seize these weapons.13 
From the above narrative one can postulate with some West Africans that ‘when the war ends, the guns remain’. 
After conflict, small arms are recycled for use in new conflicts and crime at home, or sold to other West African 
countries for use in new conflicts or to prolong ongoing ones.  
Despite the termination of most conflicts in the sub-region, smuggling and the illicit trade in small arms 
are reported to be on the increase. Others have found that many of the arms smuggling rings operate out of 
Cameroon, Equatorial Guinea and Nigeria.14 The smugglers use speed-boats to connect to the high seas, and then 
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ferry the arms back to shore. Niger Delta region of Nigeria is a classic example; arms of various shades are 
brought into Niger Delta from various locations. Most of the weapons—such as the Russian AK-47, the German 
G-3, the Belgian FN-FAL, Czech machine guns and Serbian rocket-propelled grenades (RPGs)—are supplied by 
illegal dealers and sellers, who are paid through the proceeds of bunkered (stolen) oil. In October 2006 the 
Rivers State Police Commissioner arrested Chris Ndudi Njoku, a Nigerian businessman who specialized in 
importing prohibited firearms into Nigeria. In his possession were G-3s, AK-47s and Beretta automatic rifles. 
European dealers are also involved in the trade with their Nigerian counterparts, but rarely have to face justice.15 
Legal laxity in the region has increased the spate of arms proliferation. The deterioration of many West African 
states’ capacity to enforce the rule of law has blurred the boundaries between legal and illicit markets, enabling a 
thriving trade in SALW. Some politicians in the region are known to buy these illicit weapons and supply same 
to their supporters during elections.16  
The porous nature of West Africa’s borders aids illicit trafficking of arms. Unmanned border crossing 
points and widespread corruption facilitate these transactions in small arms. The borders between West Africa’s 
states are long and full of footpaths, which are poorly patrolled. More than 150 illegal crossing points were 
identified to and from Sierra Leone and Guinea and Liberia. Over 85% of crossing points were covered by fewer 
than 11% of the customs, immigration and security officials identified. The Sierra Leone Border Threat 
Assessment Report established that smuggling of SALW can be a real threat to stability in the Mano River 
Basin.17  
Today, guns have changed. They are smaller, more sophisticated, and deadlier. Trafficking in illegal 
arms has become a lucrative and dangerous game played by many parties in the region. Blacksmiths have 
significantly improved their role in the manufacture and circulation of firearms in Ghana and other countries 
within the sub-region. At least 400 blacksmiths in southern Ghana are now serving the industry, each capable of 
making up to 80 guns per year.18  
 
Efforts to Combat terrorism in West Africa 
Many international, regional, and local efforts have been made to combat terrorism in West Africa. At the global 
level is the UN Security Council Resolution 1373 (2001) that established the Counter-Terrorism Committee 
(CTC). It was an effort to stop terrorism in all of its forms. UN Security Council Resolution 1624 (2005) is 
designed to improve border security and encourage member countries to submit updates to the CTC. 
Unfortunately, West African countries have had partial compliance as observed in the UNSCR 1624 reports. 
Other policies to stop terrorism predate the UN resolutions but have proven equally ineffective. The 
Organization of African Unity (OAU) first addressed terrorism in its 1992 Dakar declaration, and its 1999 
Algiers agreement determined to “eliminate terrorism in all its forms and manifestations.”  
At the national level, many West African states have legislated anti terrorist acts. These include:             
(a). Sierra Leone 1861 Malicious Damage Act; 
(b).Niger Titre VI du Terrorisme et du Financement du Terrorisme (2003); 
©. Ghana Anti-Terrorism Bill (2005) and the Anti-Money Laundering Bill (2007); 
(d).Senegal Loi Modifiant le Code de procedure Penale et Relative à la lutte Contre les Actes de Terrorisme 
(2007); 
(e). Gambia Anti-Terrorism Act (amended) 2008 and the Money Laundering Act (2003); 
(f). Nigeria Counter-Terrorism Bill 2010 and the Anti-Money Laundering Bill 2004. 
Besides these national legislations, some West African regional groups have taken some action to curb 
terrorism. In this category, the West African Police Chiefs Corporation, the African Centre for the Study and 
Research on Terrorism, and ‘ECOWAS’ Inter-Governmental Action Group against Money Laundering in West 
Africa as well as its Committee of Chiefs of Security Service stand prominently. Collectively, on 27 and 28 
February 2013, the new ECOWAS Counter-Terrorism Strategy was adopted by the Authority of Heads of State 
and Government of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) at its 66th ordinary session in 
Yamoussoukro, Cote d’lvoire. The West African leaders have vowed to leave no stone unturned in their fight 
against terrorism. This vow was embodied in the Political Declaration on a Common Position against Terrorism, 
which included a Counter-Terrorism Strategy and Implementation Plan. The Strategy is the result of an inclusive 
process that began in 2009 and has involved national, regional and international experts, civil society and media 
organizations. The principal purpose of the Declaration and Strategy is to prevent and eradicate terrorism and 
related criminal acts in West Africa, with a view to creating conditions conducive to sound economic 
development and ensuring the wellbeing of all ECOWAS citizens. The plans also seek to give effect to regional, 
continental and international counter-terrorism instruments and to provide a common operational framework for 
action.19 
At a time of rising terrorist activities in West Africa, the Declaration is a historic achievement in 
ECOWAS efforts to combat terrorism. Military coups, internecine conflicts, mercenary activities and 
authoritarian regimes have exposed West Africans to different incarnations of terrorism. The contemporary 
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intensification of terrorist attacks in the region, particularly following the escalation of the Niger-Delta conflict 
in 2006 and the resurgence of Boko Haram in 2009, as well as the occupation of northern Mali by terrorist 
groups in 2012, have alarmed not only West African countries but also the broader international community. 
These developments have exposed the fragility of West African states and the profound threat that terrorism 
poses to peace, stability, development and territorial integrity.20 
The key question is whether the Declaration and Strategy can solve the complicated problem of 
terrorism in West Africa, which is often intertwined with transnational criminality. The effectiveness of any such 
instrument depends on its implementation. To achieve results, systematic actions are needed to enforce the 
Strategy. The commitment of ECOWAS member states, other regional actors and international partners to the 
practical translation of the Strategy’s provisions will be key to the Strategy’s success. What does the Strategy 
intend to bring about one might ask?  
Firstly, it is important to note that although ECOWAS had long espoused the need to prevent and 
combat terrorism, the Declaration and Strategy constitute the first major ECOWAS policy framework documents 
adopted specifically to deal with the problem. The Declaration provides broad policy areas, including norms and 
principles that are shared by all member states and enshrined in relevant regional, continental and international 
legal regimes. For example, member states unequivocally condemn terrorism and related offences such as 
incitement to and financing of terrorism. It also establishes the principle that a terrorist attack in one member 
state constitutes an attack on all. This clause in effect, embodies the principle of collective security.  
Secondly, the Strategy is inspired by the United Nations Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy to provide 
comprehensive steps that states must take individually and collectively to address the threat of terrorism. It rests 
on three main pillars: prevent, pursue and reconstruct (PPR). The most important pillar is the first, which 
requires member states to undertake a wide range of activities to prevent terrorism. These include ratifying and 
effectively implementing the relevant legal regimes, eliminating conditions conducive to the spread of terrorism, 
enhancing early warning and operational intelligence, preventing extremism and radicalization, and promoting 
democratic practices and the protection of human rights. The Pursue pillar is meant to enable member states to 
undertake rapid, timely and effective responses to terrorism when it occurs. Some of the main objectives are to 
investigate, intercept and disrupt terrorists planning, networks and activities; promote a rule-based or criminal 
justice approach that seeks to bring terrorist leaders and their supporters to justice; and cut off terrorists funding 
and access to equipment, finances, training etc. The third pillar deals with the aftermath of a terrorist act and is 
aimed at rebuilding society and enabling the state to heal social wounds caused by terrorism and counter-
terrorism activities. This strategy assumes or blatantly ignores giving some prominence the weapons terrorists 
rely on the most and that already kill vast number of West Africans every year: small weapons — the pistols, 
land mines, assault rifles and handheld grenade and rocket launchers that flood the world. It is this obvious 
omission that necessitates a re-examination of the United Nations Arms Trade Treaty, in the search for a terror 
free West Africa. The re-examination is timely: small arms and light weapons have played a major role in 
exacerbating armed violence and crimes in the sub-region. 
 
The United Nations Arms Trade Treaty (ATT) 
The new ECOWAS Counter Terrorism Strategy is a historic but generalized instrument meant to curb terrorist 
acts in West Africa. As observed in the previous section there is a missing link in the strategy. The missing link 
can be discovered in re-establishing the nexus between the Strategy and ATT. The Arms Trade Treaty (ATT) is a 
multilateral treaty that regulates the international trade in conventional weapons. International weapons 
commerce has been estimated to reach US$70 billion a year.21 The treaty was negotiated at a global conference 
under the auspices of the United Nations from 2–27 July 2012 in New York. As it was not possible to reach an 
agreement on a final text at that time, a new meeting for the conference was scheduled for 18–28 March 2013. 
On 2 April 2013, the United Nations General Assembly adopted the ATT in its Resolution GA/11354. The 
United Nations General Assembly has the understanding that in all parts of the world, the ready availability of 
weapons and ammunition has led to human suffering, political repression, crime and terror among civilian 
populations. Moreover, the irresponsible transfers of conventional weapons have destabilized security in many 
regions thus contributing to human rights abuses by armed gangs. By a vote of 154 in favour to 3 against 
(Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, Iran, Syria), with 23 abstentions, the Assembly passed the 28-article 
Arms Trade Treaty, aiming to establish the highest possible common international standards for the annual 
$70 billion business that would regulate trade in conventional arms, from small arms to battle tanks, combat 
aircraft and warships. The adoption of the ATT is a turning point: it will put a stop to destabilizing arms flows 
from its signatories to conflict regions. It will prevent human rights abusers and violators of the law of war from 
being supplied with arms. And it will help keep warlords, pirates, and gangs from acquiring these deadly tools.22 
The UN Secretary General claimed the passage of the treaty is a victory for the world’s people: 
This is a victory for the world's people. The ATT will make it more difficult for deadly 
weapons to be diverted into the illicit market and it will help to keep warlords, pirates, 
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terrorists, criminals and their like from acquiring deadly arms. It will be a powerful new tool in 
our efforts to prevent grave human rights abuses or violations of international humanitarian 
law. And it will provide much-needed momentum for other global disarmament and non-
proliferation efforts.23  
How does ATT assist West Africa’s fight against terrorism and by implication her search for security? It must be 
acknowledged that the treaty will not control the domestic use of weapons in any country, but it will require 
countries that ratify it to establish national regulations to control the transfer of conventional arms, parts and 
components and to regulate arms brokers. 
The ATT covers battle tanks, armoured combat vehicles, large-caliber artillery systems, combat aircraft, 
attack helicopters, warships, missiles and missile launchers, and small arms and light weapons. It prohibits states 
that ratify it from transferring conventional weapons if they violate arms embargoes or if they promote acts of 
genocide, crimes against humanity or war crimes. ATT also prohibits the export of conventional arms if they 
could be used in attacks on civilians or civilian buildings such as schools and hospitals. In considering whether 
to authorize the export of arms, the treaty says a country must evaluate whether the weapon would be used to 
violate international human rights or humanitarian laws or be used by terrorists or organized crime. They must 
also determine whether the weapons transfer would contribute to or undermine peace and security. The treaty 
also requires parties to the treaty to take measures to prevent the diversion of conventional weapons to the illicit 
market. 
The ECOWAS member states recognize the importance of ATT and have maintained a common 
position. The common position is based on some of these principles:  
a) The inherent right of all States to individual and collective self-defense in accordance with Article 51 of the 
United Nations Charter; as well as the ECOWAS Protocol on Non-Aggression, and the Protocol on Mutual 
Assistance on Defense; 
b) the general prohibition against the use of force and the principles of peaceful settlement of disputes and non-
interference in the internal affairs of States, as embodied under Article 2 of the United Nations Charter; 
c) The purposes and principles enshrined in the ECOWAS Protocol on the Mechanism Relating to Conflict 
Prevention, Resolution, Management Peacekeeping and Security and the ECOWAS Convention on Small Arms 
and light Weapons, their ammunition and other Related Materials; 
d) the recognition of the primary responsibility of States in the trade and transfer of conventional arms and the 
respective responsibilities of exporters and importers; 
e) The transfer of conventional arms, particularly small arms and light weapons and ammunition, which must be 
expressly authorized by competent government authorities as well as a clear prohibition of transfers to 
unauthorized non-State actors 
f) the right of all States to manufacture, import, export, transfer and retain conventional arms for legitimate 
defense, security and law enforcement needs in order to participate in peace support operations; 
g) the obligations of all States to fully comply with United Nations Security Council arms embargoes and other 
decisions in accordance with the United Nations Charter; 
h) Respect for other international, regional or sub-regional commitments or decisions made or agreements on 
non-proliferation, small arms and light weapons control, and disarmament to which States involved in the 
transfer are a party.24 
The ATT had the overwhelming support of African states, civil society and faith groups. All African 
states that voted did so in favour, with the exception of Egypt, Sudan and Swaziland, which abstained. Cape 
Verde, Equatorial Guinea, Sao Tome and Principe, Sierra Leone and Zimbabwe did not vote. 
This awesome support given by the African states to ATT is understandable. The African continent 
disproportionately bears the human costs of the arms trade, having suffered the majority of deaths from armed 
violence since 1990. A 2007 investigation by Oxfam, the International Action Network on Small Arms (IANSA) 
and Safer World found that the cost of armed conflict in Africa – in military expenditures, health costs, 
reconstruction, lost tax revenue and depressed productivity – is approximately $18 billion a year, on average 
reducing a state’s economic output by 15%. Nigeria, along with other ECOWAS states, played a significant role 
in the negotiations, often speaking on behalf of “the Africa Group” – the common ATT negotiating bloc of 
almost all the sub-Saharan states. 
ECOWAS member states are not unaware of the serious challenges that confront ATT if it must work. 
The ECOWAS Commissioner for Political Affairs, Peace and Security, Mrs. Salamatu Hussaini Suleiman noted 
that some “elements critical for the ECOWAS region” were absent from the draft report of the ATT currently in 
circulation. “These include the “absence of reference to Non-State actors and their role in the illicit circulation 
and misuse of conventional arms,” as well as the need to ensure that the ATT recognizes the role of Regional 
Economic Communities such as ECOWAS and the incorporation of ammunition in the scope of the ATT.”25 
Besides this timely observation by Suleiman, making the Arms Trade Treaty work in practice is the real 
challenge for Africa and in particular West Africa. There is no way the New ECOWAS Counter-Terrorist 
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Strategy could ignore or demean the prominent role the weapons terrorists rely on their deadly acts. The new 
ECOWAS Counter- Terrorism Strategy underrates small-arms trade. 
 
New ECOWAS Counter Terrorism Strategy and ATT: the Challenges 
The New ECOWAS Counter Terrorism Strategy is anchored on regional and international cooperation; the 
cooperation is particularly in the area of intelligence, investigation, prosecution and counter-terrorism operation. 
To this end, mutual legal assistance is an absolute necessity if the subsisting shortfall and disparity in the West 
African states’ capabilities must be met. Some of the major features of the Strategy are an ECOWAS Counter-
Terrorism Coordination Unit; an ECOWAS Arrest Warrant; and an ECOWAS Black List of Terrorist and 
Criminal Networks. The Strategy also calls for the adoption of an ECOWAS Counter-Terrorism Training 
Manual. An integral part of the Strategy is its implementation plan that details the practical modalities for action. 
If implemented, the ECOWAS Arrest Warrant, for example, will strengthen cross-border cooperation among law 
enforcement agencies and eliminate safe havens for terrorists and other criminals. In particular, it will enable 
ECOWAS states to pursue terrorists across borders and so help prevent a Mali-like crisis within the region. 
While the Strategy may not be a complete answer to the problem of terrorism in West Africa, it 
certainly does provide a robust and proactive framework for containing the threat of terrorism. For its full 
potential to be realized, however, the “Strategy” must be implemented at all levels, ranging from the wider world, 
different regions and down to various states. It is a strategy that relies on interconnectivity of information in the 
onerous assignment of tracking down terrorists. This is an ambitious task. Leaving the systemic demands, it is 
therefore mandatory that ECOWAS states must take practical measures to ensure that the provisions of both the 
Strategy and the Declaration are scrupulously enforced at the national and regional level. The ECOWAS 
Commission should urgently operationalize the Counter-Terrorism Coordination Unit and set up a monitoring 
mechanism, including log frames to keep track of states implementation of the Strategy. At the same time the 
AU, through the African Centre for the Study and Research on Terrorism (ACSRT), should support ECOWAS 
endeavors, particularly the capacity-building of states and the Counter-Terrorism Coordination Unit. With the 
umbilical link between terror and arms, this recommendation holds true to the United Nations Arms Trade 
Treaty recently passed by the General Assembly. 
Unlike in the Conference, where all 193 Member States had to agree on the final text, the Assembly 
needed only a simple majority, or 97 votes, to pass the ATT text. The treaty will enter into force 90 days after 
ratified by the 50th signatory. As observed earlier, the treaty will regulate all conventional arms within the 
following categories: battle tanks, armoured combat vehicles, large-calibre artillery systems, combat aircraft, 
attack helicopters, warships, missiles and missile launchers, and small arms and light weapons. According to the 
UN Office for Disarmament Affairs, the treaty will not do any of the following: interfere with domestic arms 
commerce or the right to bear arms in Member States; ban the export of any type of weapon; harm States' 
legitimate right to self-defence; or undermine national arms regulation standards already in place.26The 
immediate challenge facing West Africa is on the implementation of the treaty. Each West African state will 
have to evaluate what resources it has available and then determine what resources are needed to implement the 
treaty. Several states have been developing capacity on reporting on other treaties and instruments such as the 
United Nations Programme of Action (UNPoA) and the International Tracing Instrument. These instruments 
impact on different areas of conventional arms, and small arms and light weapons. Central to these challenges in 
West Africa is the minimal resources needed to monitor illegal border crossings used in the arms trade.  The 
implications of ratifying the ATT will be enormous for under-staffed and technically decrepit West African 
states. Moreover, West African borders are porous and it is also an environment fraught with corruption and 
criminality. It is difficult to legislate on strict border control, something that runs contrary to subsisting 
ECOWAS treaty on free movement of citizens including smugglers of arms and on the import and export of 
goods. Unscrupulous arms dealers within the region will be jockeying to off-load their stockpiled hardware 
before industrious countries start to look critically at all the shipments that reach and depart from their shores. 
Both the ATT and the new ECOWAS Counter Terrorist Strategy face serious challenges if the two 
statutes will see the light of the day. The challenge has to do with implementation. The challenge the Counter- 
Terrorism Strategy faces is that its implementation could be hamstrung by a lack of political will. Given the 
sweeping nature of the Strategy, substantial human, financial and material resources which ECOWAS member 
states do not have in abundance, will be needed to ensure its full implementation. The Strategy is also likely to 
suffer from the perennial problem of competing priorities between counter-terrorism and other issues, whereby 
the former often loses out. Indeed, the lack of debate on the Draft Strategy before its announcement is worrisome. 
It speaks volumes of leadership within the region.  Ordinarily, there should be public enlightenment and debate 
at the level of the Authority of Heads of State and Government if the populace is to be carried along. Added to 
the above, other challenges range from poor coordination among different bureaucracies within ECOWAS 
member states and a limited access to INTERPOL records; language barriers within the region and the failure to 
incorporate international terrorist financing regulations into local laws. None of these challenges can be wished 
International Affairs and Global Strategy                                                                                                                                          www.iiste.org 
ISSN 2224-574X (Paper)  ISSN 2224-8951 (Online) 
Vol.25, 2014 
 
53 
away.  
To West Africa that is known for armed conflict, the arms trade treaty means that the international 
community recognizes that there is an external threat to the region’s safety and security. The threat is related to 
arms trade in general. The international community in ATT pledges that it will maintain better control over the 
firearms manufactured within the various sovereignties and that it will take measures to prevent the weapons that 
are manufactured from being diverted to unintended users. However, it also means that West African states will 
have to step up and participate in the process to monitor and evaluate the arms trade. In addition, the region will 
have to clean up its reputation for decrepit governance and human rights violations, the Frankenstein Monster 
responsible for armed conflict; otherwise, the West African states  themselves will be prevented from importing 
arms and ammunition needed to enhance regional security. Hopefully the international community will aid West 
African states known for limited and wasted resources, as promised and entrenched in the treaty. If not, the ATT 
might have exactly the opposite effect of that which was intended with its creation before any amendment is 
made after six years of its adoption. 
 
Conclusion   
History provides many examples of multilateral arms control and disarmament efforts. In this study, the focus is 
on the New ECOWAS Counter-Terrorist Strategy and United Nations Arms Trade Treaty recently passed by the 
United Nations General Assembly. Nations trade in arms principally for economic gain. The United States as an 
example cements its share of the arms trade by providing that “one-fourth of all U.S. foreign aid goes to helping 
the recipients buy U.S. produced weapons, equipment, or other services.”27 
The inability of arms manufacturers and suppliers to control the uses to which their military hardware 
will be put is troubling. Friends can become foes and supplying weapons can backfire. The weapons the U.S. 
shipped to Iraq when Saddam Hussein was fighting Iran in the 1980s were later used against U.S. forces in the 
Persian Gulf War. The Stinger missiles the United States supplied to Taliban forces resisting the Soviet Union’s 
invasion in Afghanistan fell into the hands of terrorists that later opposed the U.S. occupation in that country.28 
It is against this backdrop that both the Global South is supportive of an Arms Trade Treaty that will regulate the 
international trade in conventional arms, from small arms to battle tanks, combat aircraft and warships. West 
Africa as a region has paid its price for an uncontrolled proliferation of these weapons of destruction. The region 
needs to address the supply side of these arms and the manner in which they come into the region. In this way, 
the New ECOWAS Counter –Terrorist Strategy has the potentials of achieving its set goals.  
Secondly, West Africa poses important security concerns for the entire continent and the world because 
of its frequent internal conflict, corruption and weak political structures that have made the region insecure and 
unstable. The sub-region’s ill-governed spaces have expectedly attracted terrorist groups by providing access to 
transport systems, safe havens and venues for transnational funding. This study reveals that the problems that 
West Africans face come down to two fundamental challenges well within the sub-regions’ capability to control: 
establishing good political governance and sustainable economic development-both of which are foundation of 
stability and security that is needed. Internal and regional security and stability enable the formation of proper 
governance and development, but good governance and economic development also directly contribute to 
stability and security. It follows therefore that good political governance and economic development are the 
mandatory structures upon which other problems like counter-terrorism will be solved. This recommendation is 
timely for policymakers in the region who understand security exclusively from its realist-military standpoint. 
West African security and stability also require internal rule of law, order, and justice to form a safe, secure and 
stable environment in which to gain the support of the West African citizens and militants, religious 
fundamentalists and animists, the PhD holders looking for drivers’ job in Dangote’s group of companies and the 
redeemed compradors.   
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